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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFF7S ARGUMENTS RELY ON ASSERTED FACTS 
WHICH WERE NOT PART OF THE STIPULATED FACTS RELIED ON 
BY THE COURT AND WHICH FACTS ARE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS 
STIPULATED TO BY THE PARTIES. 
The parties, after completing discovery, prepared and the 
court signed a Pre-trial Order. (R.660) That Pre-trial Order 
contains a substantial number of facts which the parties 
stipulated to as being uncontroverted. (R.663-689) The parties, 
then requested the court to rule on Motions for Summary Judgment 
and that the court base its rulings on the undisputed facts set 
forth in the Pre-trial Order. (R.631) The trial court relied 
only on the stipulated facts in making its decision. In its 
Memorandum Decision (R.647) the court stated: 
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial summary 
judgment and has supported the same by the stipulated 
facts as set forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and 
other supporting affidavits, and has submitted their 
Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities. The 
defendants have objected to the Motion and have filed 
their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and have 
submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and 
Authorities. 
The defendants have objected to the publication of 
certain depositions requested by the plaintiff and 
referred to by the plaintiff in their Memorandum. The 
court finds that the Motion is well taken and will not 
order publication of the depositions at this time, and 
will not consider any of the matters referred to in the 
depositions in the disposition of these motions. 
In the court,s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R.790) the court said: 
Plaintiff, having moved for Partial Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the Motion having been considered by the 
1 
Court, and the Court having considered the 
Uncontroverted Facts and Exhibits as set forth in the 
agreed Pre-trial Order and having considered each 
parties Memoranda of Legal Points and Authorities and 
now being well advised in the premises, hereby enters 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this 
matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Uncontroverted Facts set forth in the Pre-trial 
Order are accepted by the Court as established for 
purposes of this case. Based upon said Pre-trial Order 
the Court makes the following findings of fact:.... 
Plaintiff, in its arguments, relies primarily on assertions 
of fact not included within the Pre-trial Order. Plaintiff, 
argues in its Brief, that the State accepted royalties at $.15 
per ton and that established a course of conduct setting the 
royalty rate at $.15 per ton. The stipulated facts in the Pre-
trial Order are contrary to that argument. The stipulated facts 
are that the State provided to the Plaintiff a blank form on 
which it was to report inventory and production information, and 
to calculate and pay the correct amount of royalty. (R.675, No. 
34) The State, furthermore, relied upon its Lessee, the 
Plaintiff, to provide accurate production and royalty 
information. (R.678, No. 42) When the State determined, by its 
audit, that Plaintiff had not provided the correct production and 
royalty information and had not paid the correct royalty, then 
the State took immediate action to collect the unpaid royalties. 
In its arguments that the lease is ambiguous, Plaintiff 
relies on several excerpts from depositions of various 
State officials. Those excerpts are not in the stipulated facts, 
2 
but were in depositions not published by the court and are 
disputed by the State. 
The parties have agreed on a stipulated set of facts and 
have requested the court to rule as a matter of law based on 
those stipulated facts. The stipulated facts support a decision 
in favor of the State not the Plaintiff. 
3 
POINT II. THE LEASE PROVISION WHEN GIVEN ITS PLAIN 
MEANING AND CONSTRUED TO ENFORCE THE INTENT OF THE 
PARTIES IS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSIONS 
OF THE AUDIT BY THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Plaintiff, in its Brief, takes various segments of the 
lease provision and then speculates about the various meanings of 
each segment. It then concludes that because there are 
potentially various meanings to each segment the entire provision 
is ambiguous. One can take almost any contract provision and 
break it down into segments and point out the various possible 
meanings of each segment. If that were the proper way to construe 
a lease provision every contract provision would be ambiguous. 
The lease provision should be construed to give the entire 
provision its plain meaning and to enforce the intent of the 
parties when they entered into the contract. Stevensen vs. Bird, 
636 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1981). Plaintiff does not disagree that the 
intent of the parties, when entering into the contract, was that 
the State was to receive royalties at the prevailing rate for 
federal leases. That royalty rate was tied to the federal rate 
because the Federal Government has the majority of coal reserves 
in the Western United States. The undisputed facts, which are 
easily obtainable from the Bureau of Land Management, shows that 
most federal coal leases which have been issued since 1976 have a 
royalty rate of 8%. Plaintiff should not now be allowed to avoid 
its obligation to pay fair market value for the coal by arguing 
that it had established a course of conduct by not paying the 
correct royalties to the State. 
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POINT III. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO COLLECT INTEREST 
ON THE DELINQUENT ROYALTY PAYMENTS. 
The ruling, by the District Court, that interest did not 
accrue on the delinquent payments until demand was made was 
wrong. The law of this State provides that interest is due and 
payable on delinquent payments from the date the payment is due 
not the date demand is made. Biork vs. April Industries, Inc., 
560 P.2d 317 (Utah 1977). This is even more imperative in this 
case where we are dealing with trust funds. To not require 
payment of interest would allow the trust fund to be depleted due 
to the passage of time. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that the Court reverse the 
decision of the district court and uphold the audit of the 
Division of State Lands. 
Respectfully submitted this >V&ay of November, 1988. 
NIELSEN &/§1ENI0R 
Attorneys .for Appendant 
By 
.ark B. Allre^ d 
By: V£1KJ.I!^VYVAAAJJLMX3, 
Gayle JX. McKeachnie 
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